Theory of Mind in normal development and autism, Mentalizacja artykuły

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//-->This paper appeared in Prisme, 2001, 34, 174-183.Theory of mind in normal developmentand autismSimon Baron-CohenDepartments of Experimental Psychology and Psychiatry,University of Cambridge, Downing St,Cambridge, CB2 3EB, UKAcknowledgments:SBC was supported by the Medical Research Council, theMcDonnell Pew Foundation, the Shirley Foundation, the Three Guineas Trust, and theIsaac Newton Trust during the period of this work. Parts of this article are based on apaper that appeared in the International Journal of Retardation.2A theory of mind remains one of the quintessential abilities that makes us human(Whiten, 1993). By theory of mind we mean being able to infer the full range of mentalstates (beliefs, desires, intentions, imagination, emotions, etc.) that cause action. In brief,having a theory of mind is to be able to reflect on the contents of one’s own and other’sminds. Difficulty in understanding other minds is a core cognitive feature of autismspectrum conditions. The theory of mind difficulties seem to be universal among suchindividuals. This paper describes some of the manifestations of this abnormality, andemphasizes how developmentally appropriate tests are needed in order to reveal it.Throughout the paper, the terms ‘theory of mind’, ‘mindreading’, and ‘understandingother minds’ are used synonymously.The mental-physical distinctionI start this review with the mental-physical distinction since many consider thatthis distinction is a fundamental cornerstone of our theory of mind, and one that is notexplicitly taught by parents or teachers. The test for this distinction involves the childlistening to stories in which one character is having a mental experience (e.g., thinkingabout a dog) whilst a second character is having a physical experience (e.g., holding adog). The experimenter then asks the subject to judge which operations the twocharacters can perform (e.g., which character can stroke the dog?). Whilst 3-4 year oldnormal children can easily make these judgments, thereby demonstrating their good graspof the ontological distinction between mental and physical entities and events (Wellman& Estes, 1986), children with classic autism have been found to be significantly impaired3at making such judgments (Baron-Cohen, 1989a). This is despite having a mental age atleast equivalent to a 4 year old level.Understanding of the functions of the brainThis test was also originally devised by Wellman and Estes, and involves askingthe child what the brain is for. They found that normal 3-4 year olds already know thatthe brain has a set of mental functions, such as dreaming, wanting, thinking, keepingsecrets, etc., Some also knew it had physical functions (such as making you move, orhelping you stay alive, etc.). In contrast, children with autism (but who again had amental age above a 4 year old level) appear to know about the physical functions, buttypically fail to mention any mental function of the brain (Baron-Cohen, 1989a). In thesestudies, mental age is usually assessed in terms of verbal abilities, since non-verbalmental age tends, if anything, to be higher than verbal mental age. In this way, one isable to check that the deficit is not due to insufficient mental age.The appearance-reality distinctionFlavell and colleagues (Flavell, Green & Flavell, 1986) found that children fromabout the age of 4 years old normally are able to distinguish between appearance andreality, that is, they can talk about objects which have misleading appearances. Forexample, they may say, when presented with a candle fashioned in the shape of an apple,that it looks like an apple but is really a candle. Children with autism, presented with the4same sorts of tests, tend to commit errors of realism, saying the object really is an apple,or really is a candle, but do not capture the object’s dual identity in their spontaneousdescriptions (Baron-Cohen, 1989a). Given that to do this requires being able tosimultaneously keep track of what an object looks like, versus what it actually is - howyou perceive or think about it subjectively, versus how it is objectively - it is anadditional clue that in autism there is a deficit in the development of a theory of mind.First-order false belief tasksThese tasks relate to the understanding that different people can have differentthoughts about the same situation. They are called first-order tests because they onlyinvolve inferrring one person’s mental state. (See below for discussion of second-ordertests). Normal 4 year olds can keep track of how different people might think differentthings about the world (Wimmer & Perner, 1983). We have similarly found that, wheninterpreting well-known stories such as Little Red Riding Hood or Snow White, even 4year olds will say things like “Little Red Riding Hoodthinksthat it’s her grandmother inthe bed, but really it’s the wicked wolf!”; or “Snow Whitethinksthe old woman isgiving her a nice juicy apple. She doesn’tknowthat it’s really her wicked step-mother alldressed up, and that the apple is poisoned!”. A large number of studies havedemonstrated that children with autism have difficulties in shifting their perspective tojudge what someone else might think, instead simply reporting what they themselvesknow (Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith, 1985; Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith, 1986; Leekam5 [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]

Theory of Mind in normal development and autism, Mentalizacja artykuły

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